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COMMENTARY: PROFESSIONAL PEER
REVIEW IN A "COMPETITIVE"
MEDICAL MARKET
Kathleen N. Lohr*
INTRODUCTION

I N THE OPENING to his article, Professor

Havighurst notes the
"serious confrontation" between medical professionalism, embodied in the concept of peer review, and competition in the medical
marketplace. He thus launches us directly into a consideration of
the economic and medical models of the organization and financing
of medical care-and reminds us of the continuing tension between
these two models. In commenting on his article, I would like to
explore some of the elements of these two models further, as they
may relate to the future of peer review and the quality of medical
care.
In the body of his article, Professor Havighurst examines the
proposition that peer review poses a fundamental threat to competition by "controlling" medical practice in contravention of market
forces. That proposition might be posed as follows: By aiding and
abetting anticompetitive, "collective" activities among practitioners
or facilities, does peer review effectively jeopardize competition and
thus merit attack on antitrust grounds?
In his analysis, he emphasizes that the crucial antitrust issue is
not whether a given competitor is harmed by such activities, but
rather whether competition is harmed or constrained. So, one may
inquire as to which collective professional activities undertaken in
the name of quality would improve the market, and which would
not.
Following this line of thinking, what matters is the consumer's
(in this context, the patient's) interests; the patient's welfare is at
*
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stake, not that of the competitor or provider. Within that framework, then, Professor Havighurst persuasively argues that professional peer review can be defended precisely because of its
contributions to promoting competition. When peer review is conducted with due attention to certain proprieties and procedures, it
serves one major purpose in fostering competition-namely, the
provision of information.
I.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

Having "perfect information" is, of course, one of the major assumptions of an introductory model of competition.'
Naturally,
we do not expect that professional peer review, no matter how well
organized and conducted, will yield perfect information about the
quality of medical care provided. Despite its growth and refinement
over the years, the field of quality-of-care assessment and quality
assurance is too poorly developed to produce perfect results. However, this requirement that information be perfect can be relaxed
greatly without violating the underlying principle.' Nevertheless,
two questions that should be explored further concern the targets of
information. To whom is peer review information now provided?

To whom should it be provided?
1. The assumptions about the functioning of a market economy include notions of perfect information, homogeneous products, large numbers of buyers and sellers (in this case
patients and providers), and free entry of competitors into the marketplace. See, eg., L.
REYNOLDS, ECONOMICS: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION, 24-25 (4th ed. 1973). A corollary to
the assumption of full information is that consumers can and do learn instantaneously (or at
least quickly) and at low cost the important attributes of the product that they are contemplating purchasing. This aspect of perfect information is especially untenable in the medical
field, insofar as patients in need of services can learn neither quickly nor at low cost (or low
risk) about the quality of the care they must obtain at the time that they need it. Thus, peer
review organizations are appreciably better placed to judge quality of care across a variety of
providers and to make that information known to purchasers before they need it than are
individual patients. See Weisbrod, Competition in Health Care: A Cautionary View, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, NEw DIRECTIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS (J. Meyer ed. 1983) (discussing some of the aspects of the "perfect information"

assumptions of the standard competitive model).
The second assumption about standardized products is considered later in this Commentary, as it pertains to the role of professional peer review in assessing outcomes of care.
The third and fourth assumptions-large numbers of buyers and sellers and free entry of
competition-are not directly dealt with here. The fact of large numbers of independent
actors (i.e., purchasers) in the medical marketplace is explicitly assumed to be less and less
likely over time. Finally, the fourth point appears to be rather less pertinent to professional
peer review, because it is difficult to understand how peer review as presently practiced could
operate with respect to a potential competitor who has not yet entered the market.
2. See L. REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 50 (concluding that the model is still used even
when consumers do not have full information).
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Traditionally, the ultimate goal of quality assurance activities, of
which professional peer review is of course a part, has been to improve the practice of doctors.3 In the past, this goal has been pursued mainly through one of four basic modes (or combinations
thereof).
The first mode is embedded in educational activities, which

might include grand rounds conducted within hospitals or specialty-board requirements for continuing medical education credits.
The second mode is exemplified by medical record audits or other
activities (such as analysis of insurance claims data) with feedback
to local providers. One example of this is the approach pioneered
and refined by John Wennberg and others, resulting from their
small-area analyses of geographic variations in use of services.
A third approach to traditional quality assurance activities is to
apply restrictions or institute "standard operating procedures,"

such as reminders to physicians based on various clinical algorithms
3. Quality assurance can and should be distinguished from quality-of-care assessment.
Quality assurance can be defined as "a formal and systematic exercise in identifying problems
in medical care delivery, designing activities to overcome the problems, and carrying out
follow-up monitoring to ensure that no new problems have been introduced and that corrective steps have been effective." K. LOHR & R. BROOK, QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MEDICINE:

2 (1984). The seminal work on quality-of-care measurement has been done by A. Donabedian. EXPLOaRATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND
MONITORING. VOLS. I, II, & III (1978, 1980, 1984). Brook & Lohr, Efficacy, Effectiveness,
EXPERIENCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Variations, and Quality: Boundary-CrossingResearch, 23 MED. CARE 710 (1985), provides
citations to the major empirical and theoretical works of other experts in the field, in the
course of discussing the need for a macro model of quality-assessment research that combines
investigations into efficacy of medical practices (in "ideal" settings), effectiveness (in "average" settings), per-person variations in use of services and health outcomes, and quality of
care. Komaroff, QualityAssurancein 1984, 23 MED. CARE 723 (1985) discusses several general areas of needed research, including the effectiveness of quality assurance interventions,
the feasibility of multi-institutional databanks, the improvement of the nature and use of
automated information systems (e.g., for physician feedback), and the education of patients.
The history of federal involvement in peer review has been traced by K. LOHR & R.
BROOK, supra, at 4-8. More recently, Lohr has reviewed the implementation of the Utilization and Quality Review Peer Review Organization (PRO) program and has identified the
advantages and limitations of PROs in monitoring and improving quality of care for the

elderly. K.
(1985).

LOHR, PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS: QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MEDICARE

Dans, Weiner & Otter, Peer Review Organizations. Promisesand Pitfalls, 313 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1131 (1985), reviewed the probable accomplishments of, and problems facing, PROs
in pursuing their first-year quality objectives and concluded that they (like the predecessor
Professional Standards Review Organizations, or PSROs) would still likely be seen as costcontainment agents rather than as guarantors of quality of care. Id. at 1136. See also OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICARE'S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM:

STRATE-

63-73 & App. G
(1985) (pages 63-73 treat Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) in terms of its impact on costs; Appendix G treats the impact of PROs on quality of care in relation to PPS).
GIES FOR EVALUATING COST, QUALITY, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
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concerning appropriate preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic practices. A fourth dimension involves the imposition of sanctions. In a
simple application, this involves not reimbursing providers for services rendered that are deemed medically unnecessary or inappropriate; an extreme form of this practice, adopted in the current federal
peer review program, is to bar specific providers from further participation in Medicare or Medicaid.
Much of this type of activity is directed at problems of overuse
of services-a problem that will decrease in importance as cost-containment efforts continue to ratchet down health care expenditures.
All of the above also implies that information is being provided to
one of two parties: the practitioner (or his or her institution) or the
government. Conspicuously absent is the patient or the consumer.
If professional peer review is going to serve a useful purpose in a
competitive medical marketplace, it will need to broaden its focus
from the closed circle of practitioners to include potential or actual
patients. Patients and consumers-that is, purchasers-will come
to know, indeed are already demanding to know, more about alternative medical systems and providers. Peer review systems should
find innovative ways to make reliable and unbiased information
available to them.
One possible approach is to involve the consumer directly in the
activities of peer review associations. An example of this is the program now underway between the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP) and the Medicare Peer Review Organizations
(PROs). The cooperation between these particular groups is not
surprising, since the best known peer review organizations are now
those associated (in the public's mind) with the Medicare program.
In a dozen states, an AARP member or other consumer representative sits on the PRO governing boards or acts in an advisory capacity, often participating in a variety of sensitive areas, including
decisions about provider sanctions.4
Additional efforts associated with the AARP program involve
regional workshops and outreach projects designed to help PROs
4. Personal communication with Alan Kaplan (March 21, 1986). In nine PROs, a
consumer representative is a member of the PRO governing board; in three, the representative acts in simply an advisory capacity. Board members attend regular meetings, sit on one
or more committees, and bring issues (such as problems with premature discharge or admissions to skilled nursing facilities) to the attention of the Board. In most cases, these lay
members are sponsored by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP); but in all
cases, the AARP offers them an opportunity to be affiliated with an expanding network of
volunteers, to acquire printed materials that will be useful in their PRO work, and to attend
briefings, training sessions, and conferences.
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and patient advocacy groups find ways to provide unbiased information and assistance to the elderly. These have become especially
salient because the "scope of work" clause for the second two-year
contract period for PROs includes a specific requirement for consumer outreach activities.5
A second possible way for peer review entities to improve information dissemination to consumers might be placed under the rubric of the "independent quality assurance broker." In this guise,
peer review associations of the future would be less responsible than
at present for day-to-day quality assessment activities. Rather, they
might assume a quality "auditor" role, assessing the level of quality
of care of various competing providers on behalf of large purchasers
or patient groups. In the case of large purchasers of health services
(such as self-insured corporations), the private review activities of
PROs might already serve as a prototype for this "auditor" or "broker" role.
This latter approach has not really been tried in the quality-ofcare arena, certainly not by PROs or their predecessor groups (Professional Standards Review Organizations, or PSROs). Early efforts in this area, often pioneered by business coalitions, have
usually concentrated first on costs and efficiency of care, not on
quality.6 However, some public agencies and private sector groups
5. Specifically, the final PRO Scope of Work, published by the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) in January of 1986, requires the contractor to conduct programs to
inform Medicare beneficiaries about Medicare PRO review. Such programs are to educate
beneficiaries about types of PRO review and about their rights (in particular, about their
rights should a hospital attempt to discharge a patient when the average length of stay for
that patient's DRG has been reached). HCFA permits the PROs to implement a variety of
outreach activities, including hotlines, seminars, and informational brochures. In addition, it
allows (but does not require) the PROs to include a beneficiary representative on its governing board. Because of this provision, AARP representatives expect the AARP-PRO program described above to expand considerably during the second contract period.
6. See S. MARQUIS, D. KANOUSE & L. BRODSLEY, INFORMING CONSUMERS ABOUT
HEALTH CARE COSTS (1985). This work reviews many of the programs emerging in the
mid-1980's to provide consumers with information, encouraging them to shop for cost-effective health care. It notes that, in the private sector, many employers have modified their
insurance plans to provide employees with financial incentives to shop for low-cost providers
and have combined these incentives with programs to disseminate comparative price information so that employees can identify the cost-effective providers. The Health Care Financing
Administration has supported a number of projects in this area; some adopt the "independent
broker model," which attempts to provide full, objective information to Medicaid beneficiaries considering enrollment in prepaid health plans. The California Prepaid Health Research, Evaluation and Demonstration (PHRED) Project pioneered this approach. Another
such project, "Health Choice" of Portland, Oregon, specializes in brokering options for prepaid health care services to Medicare beneficiaries and small business employers in Oregon
and to Medicaid recipients in California and Oregon. As another example, in 1984, a coalition of nearly 200 corporations, insurance companies, trade associations, and health care
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are moving in the direction of making quality-related information
more readily available to the consumer.
For instance, the health planning council in Orange County,
California, has developed a handbook that rates hospitals on a
number of dimensions related to quality of care ("indicators of
quality," abbreviated to "hospital's IQ"). 7 Among the indicators
examined are hospital staff and services, organizational and management structures, existence of supplementary services, quality assurance systems, and patient outcomes (as reflected by nosocomial
infection rates and mortality rates). Although intended for use by
local insurers and purchasers of health care, it has become well
known to, and popular with, individual consumers and patients in
that area of southern California.
In a different vein, a consumer advocacy group in the Washington, D.C., area, the United Seniors Consumer Cooperative (the Cooperative), has developed ambitious plans for disseminating
information to elderly Medicare beneficiaries about their various
health maintenance organization (HMO) options in that metropolitan area.8 Future goals include the possibility of providing qualityrelated information to their membership as part of this "independent broker" service. In the meantime, the Cooperative has formal
arrangements with several local hospitals to improve certain aspects
of hospital care, such as discharge planning and post-discharge follow-up.
All of these programs exemplify ways that the peer review organization of the future might try to make quality-related information accessible to the general public. One important issue, however,
should not be overlooked: the reliability and validity of the information provided. More harm than good can be done by the disclosure of information that has not been thoroughly evaluated against
providers in the Washington metropolitan area began a project to define hospital-by-hospital
variations in care for certain conditions and to make such information sufficiently accessible
so that employers could shop around for the most efficient providers. See Colburn, Health
Business: Shopping for Hospital Care, The Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1984, at D7, col. 1;
Aquilina & Johnson, Prudent Purchasing: Price Disclosure Attracts Interest, But Hospitals
May Face Pressure, Too, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 1, 1984, at 160 (describing several efforts
by business coalitions and state governments to develop sources of information about costs
and utilization that can be used to inform employees or purchasers, identify cost-effective
providers, evaluate preferred provider organizations, and the like).
7. See F. BODENDORF & F. MACKEY, A HOSPITAL'S IQ: INDICATORS OF QUALITY
(1985) (for the Orange County Health Planning Council).
8. Interview with J. Firman (March 21, 1986). See also Rovner, Healthtalk." The Elderly, Flexing Their Medical Muscle, The Washington Post, Mar. 12, 1986, at Health 8, col. I.
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appropriate scientific and clinical criteria.9 Peer review groups,
with access to large federal and private computerized data bases,
have nearly unparalleled opportunities to develop institution- or
physician-specific measures of quality of care. From these, they
could, in theory, develop so-called "nonintrusive" measures of quality of hospital care, such as indices of mortality or readmissions.
It is critical to the entire process, however, that such measures
be demonstrated to be clinically valid. "Outcome" measures must
be shown to be related, in medically plausible and consistent ways,
to the actual quality of care delivered in those institutions or by
those providers. They must, among other things, be convincingly
free of bias or inconsistency owing to differences in patient severity
of illness that are not otherwise adequately accounted for. 10 Premature identification of facilities that appear to have unusually high, or
low, values on such measures, before the measures have been shown
to be clinically defensible, could have quite counterproductive ef9. This may appear to be an unacceptably rigorous requirement. In other presumably
competitive markets (automobiles, for instance, or even toothpaste), advertising is considered
a key mechanism for providing information to consumers. Such advertising can and often
does involve questionably relevant information with little real scientific validity. This phenomenon is not seen as a sufficient market failure to justify large-scale efforts to provide
"clinically valid" information from an objective source. However, the existence of publications, such as CONSUMER REPORTS or CONSUMER'S CHECKBOOK (e.g., for Washington,

D.C., or the San Francisco Bay area), suggests that there is a market for such independent
information. The "CHECKBOOKS" do rate physicians, health maintenance organizations, opticians and optometrists, and hospitals, in addition to more traditional consumer items or
services.
In the medical context, poor, incomplete, or misleading information could have quite
harmful consequences. For instance, persons in potentially life-threatening emergencies
might seek care at a distant hospital, passing by a closer hospital that had been inappropriately labeled poor, thereby losing valuable treatment time. Or, patients may demand new
drugs or therapies that may not live up to advertised claims. It should be emphasized that
these observations concerning the problems associated with poor information apply regardless of whether that information is generated by "official" sources or as advertising by providers. See Soffer, Medical News: Opportunities and Dangers, 244 J. A.M.A. 1481, 1481-82
(1986) (briefly discussing some of these points in considering the role of medical news and
science writers in communicating to the medical community and laymen).
Furthermore, see Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 489, 490-91 (1970), for a discussion of the problem of asymmetrical information, illustrated by the market for "lemons" in which a used car buyer does
not know whether or not the car is of poor quality, but the seller does. This may in theory
lead to a total breakdown of the market. "Experts" who provide some information about
quality (e.g., to the buyer) may thus help to improve the functioning (or even ensure the
existence) of a market. An extension of this reasoning to a medical market seems entirely
defensible.
10. The Rand Corporation, with support from the Health Care Financing Administration, is currently conducting a study to determine the clinical validity of such insuranceclaims-based, nonintrusive patient outcome measures for indicating the level of quality of
inpatient care.
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fects. Disclosure of improperly assembled or interpreted information could be prejudicial not only to the facilities involved and their
potential patients but also to the appropriate workings of a competitive market.
Peer review entities, therefore, have a considerable responsibility
to ensure that the information they make available is accurate and
appropriate to the needs of the patient or medical-care purchaser.
It might also be noted that at least some of these enterprises at present have considerable potential for contributing to the research efforts that will eventually provide adequate and appropriate
indicators of quality.
II.

HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCTS

The previous section briefly discussed some implications of one
major assumption about competition-perfect information. This
section takes up a second tenet of the simple competitive modelnamely, that products be equivalent or homogeneous. In the purest
formulation, identical products compete on the basis of price. As
with "perfect information," we must relax this principle as applied
to the medical marketplace. There is absolutely no way to define
how the "product" of health care, such as short-term outcomes of
hospitalization, should be standardized across all patients, although
some might argue that we could standardize across groups of
patients.
For one thing, no one can say with certainty what the outcome
of medical care in a given patient for a specific complaint or illness
ought to be. For another, patients will differ in what they value as
the ultimate outcomes of their care. Hence, in considering the tensions between the economic and medical models as they relate to
peer review, we cannot impose any condition of completely homogeneous products in the medical marketplace.
But neither should we totally relinquish the notion that more or
less "like" patients should have more or less "like" outcomes of
care for a given problem or complaint. If we believe in this proposition, then marked variations in medical care use for persons or communities, who to all outward appearances are "alike," would not
seem to be a desirable or defensible phenomenon.
Better than a decade of research has documented that variations
in the per-person use of medical services are large and pervasive
throughout this country."1 For instance, per-capita use of some sur11.

The literature on small-area analysis and geographic variations in the per-capita use
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gical and medical procedures varies two-, three-, even twelve-fold
across major geographic areas of the country. Per-person variations
in the rates of hospital admissions can vary about as much. This
degree of per-person variation can be shown to occur across large
geographic areas and across rather small ones: among counties or
between cities within a single state, for instance, or among hospital
market areas within a single county. These variations are not satisfactorily explained by population characteristics (such as age, sex,
income, underlying health status or need), or by insurance coverage, or by the amount or nature of regional or local medical
resources.
High rates of variation in per-person use of medical services
mirror considerable uncertainty about the appropriateness or efficacy of a given procedure for a given patient. Low variation rates
may reflect a fairly high degree of consensus regarding the effectiveness of a given diagnostic or therapeutic intervention. However, the
very lowest variation rates can also represent an appreciable failure
to provide needed services, and the highest rates may be evidence
that some services of, at best, marginal effectiveness are being
overused.12
of services is rapidly growing. For citations to the classic works, see K. LOHR, W. LOHR &
R. BROOK, GEOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS IN THE USE OF MEDICAL SERVICES AND SURGICAL
PROCEDURES (1985); Eisenberg, Physician Utilization: The State of Research about Physicians' PracticePatterns,23 MED. CARE 461-71 (1985); and 3 HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984
(an entire issue devoted to the subject).
Variation has been studied on an international scale. In the mid-1970's, the hysterectomy
rates per 100,000 population were 220 for England and Wales, 570 for Canada, and 660 for
the United States; the prostatectomy rates were, respectively, 105, 230, and 260. See McPherson, Strong, Epstein & Jones, Regional Variationsin the Use of Common Surgical Procedures: Within and Between England and Wales, Canada, and the United States of America,
15A SOCIAL SCI. & MED. 273 (1981).

Across major regions of the United States, hospital discharges per 1000 population in
1982 totalled 143 in the West, 159 in the Northeast, 174 in the South, and 186 in the North
Central regions. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, UTILIZATION OF SHORTSTAY HOSPITALS, UNITED STATES, 1982 ANNUAL SUMMARY 3 (1984).
Finally, the following illustrates small-area variation. Across 21 Maine hospital market
areas, admissions per 10,000 population varied "moderately" (about 2.5-fold) for acute myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular disorders, and angina pectoris; variation was "very high"
(up to 8.5-fold) for miscellaneous gastrointestinal disorders and chronic lung disease; and
"very, very high" (12-fold) for atherosclerosis. See Wennberg, McPherson & Caper, Will
Payment Based on Diagnosis-RelatedGroups Control HospitalCosts?, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED.
295 (1984).
12. Discomfort with very high rates of unexplained per-capita variations in the use of
services does not justify the conclusion that no variation would be preferable. Neither does it
mean that we should attempt to define a single acceptable rate. The assumptions here are
that the extremes are probably not optimal and that a range of per-person rates of use appropriately accommodates differing values and preferences of well-informed consumers. To the
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If high variation rates indicate great uncertainty about the appropriate course of medical intervention, then we might postulate
that the quality of care-including the patient's expected outcomes-might vary markedly (even excessively) as well.13 This
would seem to violate the proposition offered above that more or
less "like" patients ought to be able to expect more or less "like"
outcomes.
Statewide peer review organizations have considerable potential
for investigating variations in the use of medical services, at least of
Medicare and Medicaid populations. 14 So, for that matter, do subsidiary organizations, such as the private review arms of federal
PROs, which serve health insurance carriers, employers, or other
major clients within relatively small geographic areas. What might
ensue from such investigations?
One important product of such peer review activities would be
documentation of the substantial range of "unexplained" variation
in the use of specific services. This activity in turn could serve as a
extent that reducing uncertainty narrows the range of variation rates and strengthens the
middle, it should contribute to the efficient functioning of the medical market.
13. See Chassin, Brook, Park, Kessey, Fink, Kosecoft, Kahn, Merrick & Solomon, Variations in the Use of Medical and SurgicalServices by the MedicarePopulation,314 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 285 (1986). The article reports large and significant differences in the use of many
surgical and nonsurgical procedures by the Medicare populations of 13 sites around the country. The differences (many higher than three-fold between the highest and lowest sites) could
not be explained by demographic characteristics of the population or by the actions of a small
number of physicians. Id. at 285, 287-89. The authors emphasize "that the differences are too
large to ignore and that unless they are understood at a clinical level, uninformed policy
decisions that have adverse effects on the health of the elderly may be made." Id. at 285.
The "serious confrontation" between the medical and economic models (i.e., professionalism vs. competition as conceived by Professor Havighurst) was neatly summarized by a representative of organized medicine. Boyle, Regional Variations in the Use of Medical Services
and the Accountability of the Profession, 254 J. A.M.A. 407 (1985) (editorial). Dr. Boyle
noted that although some variabilities in practice patterns help ensure an individualized approach to patient care and can be explained by differences in resources or patient needs and
preferences, some "unquestionably represent inappropriate medical care." Id. He goes on to
argue that quality of care is threatened when the government, insurance companies, and business coalitions promote aggressive cost containment through citing the standard assumption
that variation represents excess use. He concludes that "individual professional judgment
will be mortally wounded unless we in the profession provide effective leadership." Id. One
avenue through which the leadership called for by Dr. Boyle might be realized is increased
(and more visible) support of and participation in peer review association activities.
14. Several Medicare PROs have already initiated various projects in small-area analysis
of per-person use of services, including PROs in Iowa, Indiana, and Arizona. The data have
been used to educate medical societies and to establish required admission objectives for the
second two-year PRO contract period. For a description of the application of populationbased small-area analysis, see Wennberg, Dealingwith Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6-31, although the piece emphasizes concerns with cost containment and over-provision of services.
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guide in considering whether such variation means overly heterogeneous products (i.e., outcomes of care) and, if so, what might be
done about it. Because peer review is a professional activity, a second important result would be reduction of physician uncertainty
concerning the likely level of benefits to be expected from providing
certain services.
What directions might peer review efforts take, regarding outcomes of care, that might ultimately improve the functioning of a
competitive market? One possibility is for such organizations to
participate in efforts to develop a better understanding of the
clinical linkages between the reasons (or "indications") for use of a
service or procedure and its eventual outcomes. In this vein, better
information is needed to clarify the efficacy of tests, procedures, or
medications when used in "ideal" circumstances; the effectiveness
of those same services or treatments in "average" settings; and the
expected outcomes for patients with specific indications for use of
those services or treatments. This information may be especially
important when there are "competing" services to be considered,
such as whether a medical or surgical intervention would be more
appropriate for a given illness or which between hospital or home
would be the more suitable locale for post-treatment recuperation.
Peer review organizations should be intimately concerned with
the question of per-person variations in the use of services-and the
presumed variations in patient outcomes-within their geographical
areas. Our confidence in the "medical model" depends in part on
our confidence that we are getting not only "our money's worth"
but also services appropriate to our human medical needs. Ironically, given the tensions between the medical and economic models,
maintaining that confidence may depend in part on "making the
product more homogeneous"-that is, reducing the unexplainable
and unacceptable degree of variation in use of services and outcomes of care. It should be clear that success in this endeavor
serves to improve the functioning of the economic model as well as
the medical model.
III.

COMPETITION AND THE FUTURE ROLE
OF PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS

The final section of this Commentary looks to the future. It
asks: What might current trends in reimbursement and organization of medical care-predicated on a continued emphasis on competition-herald for professional peer review?
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The nation seems unlikely to return to the "halcyon" days of
cost-based reimbursement for hospital care. Undoubtedly the move
to payment on the basis of prospectively set prices (even if the actual payments are retrospective) will continue in the short run in
the inpatient setting, even in the face of known drawbacks to the
diagnosis-related group (DRG) classification system. 15 Such prospective payment schemes might even be extended to the ambulatory and long-term-care settings, although the limitations and
complexities of DRG-based payment schemes as applied to these
other settings makes that eventuality problematic. 6 In the longer
run, the majority of certain programs, such as Medicare, will probably be financed on a capitation basis. 7 Further, just as the federal
and state governments have moved from "prospective" payment to
capitation for Medicare and Medicaid,'" so might Blue Cross/Blue
15. Criticisms of the current diagnosis-related group (DRG) basis for reimbursement
are rampant. Many relate to the problem that DRGs do not sufficiently take cognizance of
differences in patient severity of illness. The literature on severity-of-illness issues is extensive. See generally HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF RESEARCH
AND DEMONSTRATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REVIEW (1984 Annual Supplement).

Other criticisms stem from the perception that DRGs do not contain adequately homogeneous case designations. Some experts claim that this arises from flaws in the coding system
on which DRGs are based (the International Classification of Diseases, version 9, clinical
modification, commonly known as ICD-9-CM), which allows equivalent patients to be classified into one of several different DRGs (presumably the most remunerative). See, ag.,' Iezzoni & Moskowitz, Clinical Overlap Among Medical Diagnosis-Related Groups, 255 J.
A.M.A. 927 (1986). This last problem may have less to do with the ICD-9-CM system per se
than with the extent of physician or medical recordkeeping error with respect to the correct
principaldiagnosis, since it is that diagnosis on which DRG classification is based. For two
reports about this aspect of data quality, see Cohen, Bernier, Tam, Schimel, Postel, Scherdt &
Stamm, Data Quality and DRGs: An Assessment of the Reliability of Federal Beneficiary
DischargeDatain Selected Manhattan Hospitals,10 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 238 (1985); and
Lloyd & Rissing, Physicianand Coding Errorsin PatientRecords, 254 J. A.M.A. 1330 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Mitchell, Physician DRGs, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 670 (1985) (discussing
some of the issues concerning the extension of the DRG system to payment for physicians'
services).
17. See, e.g., Thurow, Medicine versus Economics, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 611, 612
(1985). Thurow predicts that in the future, payors will reimburse providers on the basis of
fixed fees for groups of potential patients, that corporations (and the middle class) will take
the lead, and that government (and the poor and elderly) will follow. He envisions a threetiered system, with government and private corporations underwriting per-capita payment
systems for the poor or elderly and employees (respectively), and a third tier in which people
can purchase additional health care in a free-market setting. Id. at 613.
The shift to capitated systems may be less direct or smooth than implied herein. One
reason is that capitation payment schemes can be seriously undermined when substantial
differences in patient severity of illness exist and are not sufficiently taken into account. It
may not be any easier to control for severity-of-illness variations in a capitated environment
than it has been in the DRG-based prospective payment environment. See supra note 15.
18. Medicare's experience with TEFRA (Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
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Shield and other commercial insurance carriers shift toward capitation. Moreover, employers and corporations may begin to move beyond simply accepting risk when self-insuring. They may choose
instead to set up HMOs, develop other per-capita arrangements involving preferred provider organizations, or contract with primary
care networks.
In short, the nation may in coming years experience an appreciable expansion in the willingness of large public or private sector
entities to become aggressive purchasers of medical resources on behalf of their beneficiaries or enrollees. Furthermore, rather than
continue to rely on increasingly complicated case-mix- or severityof-illness-adjusted DRG-based reimbursement schemes, such purchasers may understandably prefer to emphasize per-capita, truly
prospective payment mechanisms. Over the years, however, the
number of such independent, cost-conscious purchasers of health
care services may shrink, even as their average size rises.
During this period, the nation may experience considerable
changes in utilization patterns. By now the drop in hospital admissions and bed-days is a widely acknowledged phenomenon. 19 A variety of factors, such as heightened demand for obtaining certain
services in ambulatory settings as opposed to hospitalization, will
foster a continued decrease in inpatient care. This will surely lead
to excess capacity of hospitals (or hospital beds), with heightened
competition among hospitals for patients and, eventually, hospital
closures. Hospitals will scramble to compete for patients, especially
1982) health maintenance organizations, which are reimbursed on a per-enrollee basis, will be
an important indicator of the future of capitation in Medicare. Another possibility is to let
Medicare fiscal intermediaries and insurance carriers (e.g., the statewide Blue Cross and Blue
Shield associations) participate in capitated payment schemes, under which they would be "at
risk" if outlays exceed per-person payments. The Arizona Health Care Cost Containment
System, which delivers care to indigents, uses a statewide competitive bidding process and
prepaid capitated financing. Its success or failure will provide evidence of the feasibility and
desirability of capitated plans in Medicaid. The Program for Prepaid Managed Health Care,
sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the National Governors' Association,
and the Health Care Financing Administration (and which is currently being evaluated by
The Rand Corporation), delivers care to Medicaid eligibles and will also provide evidence of
the impacts of a capitated system on use and quality of care. Various strategies for using
market forces to control health care costs are discussed by Ginsburg, Market-OrientedOptions in MedicareandMedicaid, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES,
NEW DIRECTIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS 103-18 (J. Meyer ed. 1983).
19. See, eg., PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CON-

GRESS 20 (1986). For details on changes in Medicare admission rates, see Beebe, Lawrence &

Lintzeris, Health CareFinancingTrends: MedicareAdmissions and Length ofStay for ShortStay Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Fall 1985, at 117-19.
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for selected (relatively lucrative) portions of the health care market,
and they will do so facing larger and more aggressive purchasers
than ever before.
One outgrowth of these changes may be a considerable move
toward "networks" or other larger entities with which physicians
and hospitals will align themselves. To be competitive, these networks-independent practice associations, preferred provider organizations, even prepaid group practices-will have to institute strict
utilization and peer review to guard against overuse of services on
the one hand and deterioration in the quality of care on the other.
The greater the pressures to compete for the business of large health
care purchasers, the more important, from the patient's or consumer's point of view, becomes the emphasis on quality of care.
Put another way, very considerable incentives for intensive, internal utilization review reside with the provider networks; presumably, organized peer review entities will not have much role in this
activity in the future. Conversely, very considerable incentives for
close monitoring of quality of care reside with patients and purchasers, as they worry both about what they are getting for their money
and about possible threats that underprovision of services poses for
quality of care and patient outcomes. This means that the business
of peer review, both public and private, will become more and more
concerned with quality of care.
That organized peer review entities might expand their quality
of care activities on behalf of the government, self-insurers, commercial insurance carriers, corporations, employee groups and unions, and patient representative groups can and should be seen as
contributing to the viable working of a competitive market. This
would be true, however, only when the expansion serves the two
dimensions to competition mentioned earlier: first, providing reliable and valid information to the consumer as well as to the practitioner, and, second, bringing to the public's attention instances
when variations in both use of services and patient outcomes are
larger than can be satisfactorily explained or tolerated.
Thus, the future of peer review organizations in a competitive
health services environment may lie in the following types of activities: first, being "independent brokers" in assessing the level of
quality of care of competing provider networks on behalf of large
purchasers, and, second, acting on behalf of patient and consumer
groups to help them protect the health of their members. In these
ways, peer review organizations can serve the highest ideals of med-
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ical professionalism and ease the potential for destructive confrontation between the economic and medical models of health care.

